Showing posts with label Preece. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Preece. Show all posts

Monday, 1 June 2009

Mental Model Literature Review - Part 3

This post continues my contextual/literature review and attempts to synthesise the older seminal work and newer work together.


Back in 1983 Gentner and Stevens presented a typology of methodologies to study mental models. They use the word 'eclectic' which, I deduce, may be where some current writers on the subject may have led to an imprecise use of the term mental model which I'll address in this post. The methodologies that Gentner and Stevens (1983, p2) present are:

  • protocol analysis

  • traditional cognitive psychology experiments

  • developmental studies

  • expert-novice studies

  • simulation of possible psychological models

  • comparison of the results of that simulation with what humans do

  • field observation

  • comparison across cultures

  • comparison across time within the same culture

  • designed field observation



Where Johnson-Laird's 1983 book focused upon the explication of mental models Gentner and Stevens' 1983 book focused upon application. Although these books are 25 years old they are still cited by current writers as the roots of mental model research. As interaction design emerged as a design discipline in its own right during the 1980s, cognitive scientific research informed its understanding of human behaviour. With the research came notable cognitive scientists such as Donald Norman. With the maturation of the discipline the tools for an interaction designer began to use personas in order for the design team to come to understand their target users. Personas are archetypes, derived from field observations, that embody the characteristics of each target user for the designers. The can then use the persona as a character mindset they can enter when they need to see the design from a user's point of view. Personas are not the same as a mental model

Over the last decade industry have identified different methodologies in order to understand the user in order to aid the design for them. One such methodology is affinity diagrams of user behaviours taken from ethnographic data. It is Indi Young from UX design company Adaptive Path who in recent years has been advocating affinity diagramming. It is a thorough methodology that interaction industry insiders find very rewarding. It is also problematic as this methodology is also referred to as mental models. In her 2008 book Mental Models: Aligning Design Strategy with Human Behaviour defines mental models as:


“Mental Models are simply affinity diagrams of behaviors made from ethnographic data gathered from audience representatives” (Young, 2008, pp2).


Not every interaction designer accepts this interpretation of a mental model. Nathan Kendrick of Designmap, in two replies to a posted question raised by Tom Dell'Aringa on the Interaction Design Association discussion board, disputes that this is nothing more than a task model. Dell'Aringa was asking for explication upon a mental model example in Young's book that uses an alignment diagram. Kendrick's response identifies with a cognitive scientific definition of the term, he says,


"This is a task model. Not mental model... mental models are the users (sic) understanding of how a system works. This particular method is to bridge user research and site IA. (…) the key difference meaning the task model has undergone analysis, synthesis, and ultimately organized by someone other than the user. A mental model is a user's messy, sometimes illogical understanding of how something operates." (Dell'Aringa, 2007)


In an podcast interview with Jared Spool, Indi Young defended her interpretation of the term against the confusion it causes within the discipline:

"It doesn't cause as much confusion as it causes debate. In HCI they teach a very narrow definition of mental model, they say it is something the user has in their head of how some particular piece of equipment they are working with works, or how some particular interaction they're going through works. In cognitive science, actually years ago, the definition of mental model had been expanded to mean lots of different concept models, so the idea that they are teaching just this one very narrow definition is a little dismaying. But if people can just open their mind to the idea there are lots of different ways to use that phrase mental model then it makes a lot of sense or the type of models that we're interpreting. We're building these mental models not out of something we're thinking, but we're letting the tasks build themselves, so basically all we're doing is interpreting this data that's already out there that already exists in other people's heads as to their mental model of how they get something done. So its not a mental model of how something works but its how they get something gets done. So maybe they are using lots of different tools and doing lots of different interactions, it is just a tiny extension of the old HCI definition. So I think that's totally acceptable. People may want to debate it - and say 'well gosh we are going to be confused' - but I don't think that, we're smart monkeys and we wont be confused." (Spool, 2008)


Gentner and Stevens (Gentner & Stevens, 1983, pp1-3) saw mental model research as fundamentally concerned with human’s knowledge of their world being examined and understood through cognitive processing. They identified the research, twenty-five years ago, as having three key dimensions that define and characterize it. These three dimensions inspect the nature of the modelling from the study of the methodology, the domain, and the theoretical approach. I began this post with a list of the various methodologies that they identified, and I will deal with methodology to place Young’s affinity modelling into a context. Before I do I wish to explore the other two dimensions, of which the domain contains the subject for the theoretical approach and selected methodology.

The domain they advance is the context for the experience of the phenomenon. The subject that a person focuses upon to make sense of happens in the real world. The person needs to predict what will happen based upon the affordances of the subject in question, past experiences of similar subjects, and inferences. The domain in which this happens either facilitates the successful dynamic construction of a model, or impedes it. Preece in her book Human Computer Interaction identifies (Preece et al, 1995, p136) the context-dependent nature of a model formed within a domain as a functional model. In her eyes the advantage of being context-dependent is that the mental model is easier to use. The domain can also be identified as the interactive system that the person is involved with and trying to make sense of. Preece in her later book Interaction Design: Beyond Human-Computer Interaction (Preece et al, 2002, p92) expands on learning from being context-dependent within a domain. She makes the important point that as the person develop their learning of how to use and work within the system, it doesn’t mean that the person actually understands HOW that system works. This is a crucial pivotal point that both Norman (1998) and Cooper (2007) address by different terms, they both identify making sense of how to use a system as the user’s mental model but the former calls understanding the system as the system model, whilst the latter calls this the implementation model.

The final dimension raised by Gentner and Stevens is that of the theoretical approach. Twenty–five years ago they identified a confluence of research from cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence that synergised the research of the day. This confluence has certainly developed as cognitive science grew from its multidisciplinary origins. Now recognised as a discipline in its own right it has continued its application across multidisciplinary boundaries, and has influenced interaction design, itself a discipline built upon synergy. Mental models have become a useful tool for the interaction designer, and it is still crucial to maintain a clear understanding of what is meant by the term. Young, with her definition of mental model has created a very useful tool for interaction designers but also has muddied the waters. In interview she is partly correct in citing that cognitive science over the years has expanded the “definition of mental model” but it is not HCI who are teaching “just this one very narrow definition”, it is defining affinity diagramming up using a recognised term. It is essentially a decision made at the publisher’s that is making the confusion, as Young’s methodology is proven, useful and informative, but it is as interaction designer Nathan Kendrick sums it up,


“A mental model is a user's messy, sometimes illogical understanding of how something operates." (Dell'Aringa, 2007)




In this post I wanted to synergise several points into a thread spanning twenty-five years of the literature and place Young’s very useful methodology into a clearer context. I feel that the methods she uses can be very useful in my future practical project to understand and evaluate aspects of the user’s behaviour and attitude towards defining a design model, but to understand a user’s mental model the cognitive scientists have tested methodologies that will be more useful.

Again I must reiterate that this post is not a thesis but a process. This post together with earlier and later posts will be re-read and re-evaluated in order to write a paper to support my PhD project. There are still additional theories I wish to explore such as Suchman’s situated actions, aspects of embodied cognition and Winograd, that I haven’t yet touched upon in these posts so far. There are several useful points I may add to a new post that begins this process, but I foresee the paper being the place where these influences will appear.


References



DELL'ARINGA, T. (2007) Mental Model question restated. 26 June. Available from: IxDA Discussion Archives [Accessed 13 May 2008]. http://www.ixda.org/discuss.php?post=17629&search=mental+model

SPOOL, J. (2008) SpoolCast: Reviewing Mental Models with Indi Young [online]. [Accessed 13 May 2008]. Available from World Wide Web: http://www.uie.com/brainsparks/2008/03/17/spoolcast-reviewing-mental-models-with-indi-young/ [Podcast]

See Design Model - statement for a full list of references this post cites beyond those indicated above.


Thursday, 28 May 2009

Mental Model Literature Review - Part 1

In this post I not only wish to contextually review the literature on mental models but also to define the use of the term that will be central to my first practical PhD project. Mental Models is unfortunately a term that has had its meaning diluted by non-cognitive science practioners such as Indi Young (more on this later). Therefore I will be exploring Mental Models firstly from a cognitive science perspective in order then to draw parallels and influences into Interaction Design. This post is not a defined thesis on my part but an attempt to draw together the essence of mental models. There will be theoretical holes in what I will post, so feel free to point them out. Look on what follows as simply my first attempt to stitch together my understanding of a very complex cognitive science discourse, from a discipline that is not my own. I will continue this literature review across several posts with the aim of refining my understanding.

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To begin with I am going to quote psychologist Kenneth Craik (1914-1945) from his 1943 book The Nature of Explanation. Craik is cited by cognitive scientist Johnson-Laird in his 1983 seminal work Mental Models as proposing the first modern hypothesis on humans being processors of information in order to understand phenomena.

”If the organism carries a “small-scale model” of external reality and of its own possible actions within its head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future situations before they arise, utilise knowledge of past events in dealing with present and future, and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to emergencies which face it.” (Craik, 1943, p57)

This statement was to open up a whole new area of research within the already new scientific discipline of cognitive science. By 1983 Mental Models research had two seminal works that explored this concept. Johnson-Laird proposed that the human mind uses propositional reasoning instead of reductive mathematical logic to understand phenomena. Gentner and Stevens, in their edited collection of papers, also entitled Mental Models, present a diverse range of views, including an early paper by Dr Donald Norman who here begins the discourse upon the Design Model. If Johnson-Laird proposes propositional reasoning, then Gentner and Stevens' book explores the structure of knowledge representations specific to different domains of application. Johnson-Laird states in introducing his book,

"The psychological core of understanding, I shall assume, consists in your having a 'working model' of the phenomenon in your mind. (…) you have a mental representation that serves as a model of an entity (…) A model has, in Craik’s phrase, a similar ‘relation-structure’ to the process it models, and hence it can be useful explanatorily; a simulation merely mimics the phenomenon without relying on a similar underlying relation-structure. Many of the models in people’s minds are little more than high-grade simulations, but they are none the less useful provided that the picture is accurate; all representations of physical phenomena necessarily contain an element of simulation." (Johnson-Laird, 1983, p2/4)

The importance here is that a 'relation-structure' the functionality of a cognitive conceptual model. To propose an explanation on how a phenomenom works, a model that is constructed by a person is NOT improved by them also trying to understand the specific context it is encountered in. The specific context is not transferable to another context but the mental model will be. The model will not be complete each time it is applied, but in Chomsky's term 'explanatory adequate'. To Johnson-Laird because a mental model is constructed by mental logic, mental logic has six main problems. Inference, formulation and deduction all are contributory to the empirical nature of mental logic. He lists the problems as (pp39-40):

  1. People make fallacious inferences.

  2. Which logic, or logics, are to be found in the mind?

  3. How is logic formulated in the mind?

  4. How does a system of logic arise in the mind?

  5. What evidence there is about the psychology of reasoning suggests that deductions are not immune to the content of the premises.

  6. People follow extra-logical heuristics when they make spontaneous inferences.


People's powers of deriving a reasoned solution based upon a premise they have, or from precedence is strongly affected by their own cognition that is deceptive. Mental models, although helpful to understanding a phenomenon, are inherently 'incomplete' (Johnson-Laird, 1983)(Norman, 1983), 'doubtful validity' (Norman, 1983), 'fragmentary' (Norman, 1998), 'dynamically constructed' (Preece et al, 1995), and 'not always correct' (Gentner and Gentner, 1983). As Johnson-Laird argues, the formulation of a mental model to understand a phenomenon is 'propositional reasoning' on behalf of each individual. Norman explains this in more accessible terms:


"The power of mental models is that they let you figure out what would happen in novel situations. Or, if you are actually doing the task and there is a problem, they let you figure out what is happening. If the model is wrong you will be wrong too." (Norman, 1998, p71)


If the person's proposition regarding the causality, relationships and mechanisms within a phenomenon encountered is poorly appreciated then their understanding of that phenomenon will not work. But an incomplete proposition that does capture the behaviour of that phenomenon, that for them represents the causality and mechanisms of that phenomenon based upon previous experiences, or from fragmentary experiences of aspects of similar phenomena, can arrive at an 'explanatory adequate' mental model. This is why Norman describes the human mental process as "unscientific" that supports Johnson-Laird's argument that humans do not use reductive mathematical logic as the brain is a computer. In their book The Embodied Mind Varelo et al refer to phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) to contextualise human cognition from a different perspective, where a human's 'sensorimotor capacities' is enabling enough to successfully interact within an environment with the phenomenon. According to their thesis Husserl claimed


"that to understand cognition, we cannot take the world naively but must see it instead as having the mark of our own structure. He also took the second step, at least partially, in realizing that that structure (the first step) was something that he was cognizing with his own mind.(…)He explicitly focused on the experience of consciousness in what he called the “lived-world.” The lived world is not the naive, theoretical conception of the world found in the natural attitude. It is, rather, the everyday social world, in which theory is always directed toward some practical end. Husserl argued that all reflection, all theoretical activity, including science, presupposes the life-world as a background. The task of the phenomenologist now became the analysis of the essential relation between consciousness, experience, and this life-world.” (Varelo et al, 1996, pp16-17)


For each person to construct a mental model of a phenomenon based upon proposition reasoning, entails them cognizing the problem from their previous experiences built into a appropriate functional model (Preece et al, 1995) developed from existing knowledge of a similar context. As a mental model is a dynamic conceptual tool to solve a problem within a phenomena, they can be be said to be drawn from Husserl's concept of the 'lived-world'.

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References



See Design Model - statement for list of references cited in this post.